Overview:

Empirical information was traditionally excluded from epistemological theorizing or system building. For several decades now, that exclusion has been challenged. For example, it has been suggested that the epistemic use of even such resources as memory should be informed by (more or less articulate) empirical appreciation of what are the internal marks of reliability in the output of the relevant processes. Such illustrations could be multiplied. The ways in which empirical information has been thought to legitimately play a role in epistemology are quite diverse and nuanced.

The place for what is a priori within epistemology has, of course, undergone some re-evaluation in association with changing tolerance for empirical information. But, while epistemology may no longer be understood as a purely a priori discipline, most approaches seem to recognize some continuing role for the a priori. However, authors representing various approaches have not been articulate on this point. Delineating the place (if any) for the a priori should go hand-in-hand with articulating a place for the empirical.

We will investigate these issues by reflecting on major approaches in contemporary epistemology such as Laurence BonJour’s internalist coherentism, Alvin Goldman’s externalist reliablism, Michael Williams’ contextualism, and David Henderson and Terry Horgan’s Iceberg-ology. The core text will be Bonjour’s important new book on a priori knowledge, A Defense of Pure Reason (Cambridge, 1998), to be supplemented by writings by various contemporary epistemologists.

The 1999 Spindel Conference in Philosophy at the University of Memphis will be devoted to sustained articulation of positions on these issues. Henderson and Horgan have already agreed to present a seminal paper. This seminar is intended as a warm-up to the Spindel Conference for both graduate students and at least two of the participants.

Course Requirements:

Weekly short responses to the assigned readings. Midterm takehome. Choice of a term paper or a take-home final exam.
 
 Schedule:

Date	Assignment
1-25	Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969); Kitcher, "The Naturalist Returns" (1992)
2-1	Quine, "Epistemology Naturalized" (1969); Kitcher, "The Naturalist Returns" (1992)
2-8	Classical Conceptual Analysis in Epistemology: Alston, "Concepts of Epistemic Justification."
2-15	Conceptual Approaches/Reflective Equilibrium: Goodman, Fact, Fiction, & Forecast (selection); Henderson, "Epistemic Competence."
2-22	Conceptual Approaches/2D Modal Semantics: Henderson, "What is A Priori About Action"; Horgan & Graham, "Southern Fundamentalism."
3-1	BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapter 1
3-8	BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapter 2
3-15	Spring Break
3-22	BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapter 3
3-29	BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapter 4
4-5	BonJour, In Defense of Pure Reason, Chapters 5-6
4-12	Henderson, "Epistemic Competence and Contextualist Epistemology."
4-19	Henderson and Horgan, "Iceberg Epistemology."
4-26	Henderson and Horgan, material for Bled Conference