The 2002 annual meeting will be held October 11-12

 hosted by 

University of Missouri-Columbia

Columbia, MO 65211

 Keynote speaker

  CHRISTINE KORSGAARD

Harvard University

"Integrity and Interaction"

Local Arrangements Information

12:00 -  Registration:

4:30pm: KEYNOTE ADDRESS.

6::00 -- 7:30  Free Time

7:30pm: Drinks

8:00pm: Banquet, followed by brief business meeting and the Presidential Address

        Andrew Melnyk, Philosophy and the Study of Its History

                Donrey Media Group Room of the Reynolds Alumni Center

8:30

12:00 Noon: Lunch Break

Questions regarding the program? Contact Tomis Kapitan (kapitan@niu.edu).  

Questions regarding local arrangements? Contact Andrew Melnyk (melnyka@missouri.edu).

Archived Programs of Past Meetings:

Contact David Henderson for information on membership and mailing list

 Fred Adams (University of Delaware) and Jeremy Cushing (University of Massachusetts), “Truth and nothing but the truth: Foley’s new theory of knowledge”

In this paper we examine a new theory of knowledge proposed by Richard Foley.  Foley suggests that knowledge that p is comprised of holding a comprehensive set of true beliefs without relevant lacuna in the neighborhood of the truth p.  Foley draws support for this by showing that in all Gettier-style cases where a person lacks knowledge but has a true belief that p, there is always a relevant truth q of which the person is unaware.  Foley builds into his criteria for knowledge that there be no such relevant truth q of which the knowing subject is unaware.  So truth and nothing but truth is added to true beliefs to yield knowledge, on his account.  In this paper, we argue that Foley's view is both too strong and too weak and provide examples to support these claims.
 

Jared Bates  (University of Minnesota Duluth), "The old problem of induction and the new reflective equilibrium"

  In 1955, Goodman set out to "dissolve" the problem of induction, that is,
   to argue that the old problem of induction is a mere pseudo-problem not
   worthy of serious philosophical attention.  This dissolution, which has
   enjoyed tremendous acceptance, essentially involved an application of what
   has since been called the method of reflective equilibrium.  Largely in
   connection with naturalism in epistemology, the reflective equilibrium
   method has lately been the subject of considerable attention.  I will
   argue that, under current views of the nature and status of the reflective
   equilibrium method, it can no longer provide a basis for a dissolution of
   the problem of induction, because it has become itself an essentially
   inductive method.  This paper, then, examines how the old problem of
   induction crept back in while nobody was looking.
 

Tim Black (University of Utah), “Skepticism and Warranted Assertion”

 Consider the following skeptical argument:
   1.   I don't know that I'm not a brain-in-a-vat.
   2.   If 1, then 3.
   3.   Therefore, I don't know that I have hands.
We should favor a Moorean response to this argument, a response according to which the standards for knowledge are always comparatively low and according to which we may deny both the argument's conclusion and its first premise. Yet this sort of response is troubled by the fact that there are contexts in which it seems false that we know that we  have hands. In defense of the Moorean's response, I argue that she can employ the notion of warranted assertability in explaining why it sometimes seems false that we know that we have hands - since we are sometimes  warranted in asserting that we don't know, it can seem false that we do know. I also argue that we should favor the Moorean response over other responses to skepticism.
 

Christopher Ciocchetti (Centenary College), “The Responsibility of the Psychopathic Offender”

In this paper, I argue that the responsibility-affecting defect of psychopaths is
their incapacity for understanding acts within relationships. I begin with Piers
Benn's account of psychopaths as incapable of forming participant reactive
attitudes. Benn argues that participant reactive attitudes are essentially
communicative and the ability to form and understand participant reactive
attitudes is crucial to being a member of the moral community. Against Benn, I
argue, though participant reactive attitudes can be communicative, they are not
essentially communicative. Instead, they can be simply expressive. Therefore, we
must consider psychopaths members of the moral community; however,
psychopaths fail to understand the significance of their actions for the
relationships. This inability renders punishment, as an attempt to rectify wrong
relationships, inappropriate for psychopaths. Psychopaths have diminished
responsibility, insofar as they have forfeited some rights by committing an offense,
but are not appropriate candidates for punishment because they cannot
understand its significance.
 
 

Erin M. Cline  (Baylor University), “A Revolution of the Second Order”

 
This paper explores Kant's notion of the virtuous disposition.  In it I argue that the virtuous disposition is seen in the individual who manifests moral second-order desires.  I begin with an overview of Kant's definition of disposition as the "supreme maxim" of morality.  This is followed in the second part of the paper by a description of Harry Frankfurt's distinction between first- and second-order desires and I apply these distinctions to Kant's three gradations of the natural propensity to evil.  The paper concludes with description of Kant's views on the nature and function of a moral "revolution," especially his argument that one who has had a dispositional revolution
wants to have good first-order desires.  I hold that for Kant virtue consists in this disposition, and the dispositional revolution he requires for us to be virtuous is a radical change in our second order desires.
 

Heimir Geirsson  (Iowa State University), “Moral Twin Earth: The Intuitive Argument”

Horgan and Timmons have argued that our intuitions about the semantics of non-moral language and moral language differ, and that while twin-earth semantic intuitions generate one result in Putnam´s twater case, moral twin-earth fails to generate comparable results for moral terms. Horgan and Timmon´s conclude from this that the semantic norms governing the use of natural kind terms differ from the semantic norms governing the use of moral terms. I will argue that Horgan and Timmons' intuitive moral twin-earth argument fails to derail the new moral realism. Further, I will discuss Boyd's semantic theory and raise problems for it that do not rely on the use of moral twin-earth.
 

Sanford Goldberg (University of Kentucky), “Formulating Anti-Individualism”

Anti-individualism (henceforth ‘AI’) is a thesis regarding the  individuation of the propositional attitudes.  Here I argue that the  traditional formulation of AI must be conditionalized, in order to square with two desiderata regarding AI itself.
 

 Thomas Kiefer (University of Nebraska-Lincoln), "Kripke and the Meaning
of Identity Statements"

Kripke's position in "Identity and Necessity" and Naming and Necessity does not have the resources to account for the semantic difference, the difference in meaning, between identity statements such as (1) "Hesperus is Hesperus" and (2) "Hesperus is Phosphorus."  To forestall any straw man charges, I summarize three crucial components of this position. Although Kripke offers no argument why (1) and (2) are both necessary (if true), I offer a candidate: Given these three components and the principle of compositionality, (1) and (2) both mean that a certain celestial object is identical with itself.  Thus, there is no semantic difference between (1) and (2).  Support for this candidate comes from traditional notions of necessary truth and his texts.  I conclude that a possible defense for Kripke fails, and the intuition that (1) and (2)
are semantically different is not confused.  Kripke's failure here counts as a significant objection to his position.

Brian Kierland (Augustana College),  "The Desire Theory of Claim-Rights"

In this paper, I consider analyses of our concept of a claim-right in terms of our concept of an owed duty.  I consider the Simple View, which takes a claim-right to be nothing more than an owed duty.  I reject this analysis on the grounds that it leaves out something essential to claim-rights, namely, an element of control over the relevant duty possessed by the right-holder.  I then consider three analyses incorporating some element of control.  I defend the Desire Theory, which takes this element of control to be the existence of the relevant duty depending on certain desires of the right-holder.  I argue this analysis is superior to both the Choice Theory, which takes the element of control to be the
right-holder's possession of a power to waive the relevant duty, and the Mixed View, which incorporates the distinctive elements of both the Desire Theory and the Choice Theory.
 
 

John Kultgen (University of Missouri-Columbia) “Aristotle on Civic Courage”

The paper develops Aristotle's distinction between genuine courage, which requires the
 rule of practical reason in the individual's personal life, from civic courage, which is produced by indoctrination by the state.  Genuine courage is necessary for happiness.  Civic courage, epitomized by the Spartans at Thermopylae, serves the state but not the citizen in everyday life.  Some obscurities and limitations of Aristotle's analysis are noted.  Then his distinction is applied to modern times, resulting in cautions against glorifying the heroism of the soldier and extending military training to all of society.
 

Bradley Monton (University of Kentucky), “Presentism and Time Travel”

Presentism (the thesis that only presently existing things exist) is  commonly thought to be incompatible with time travel. I argue (by  appealing to either the principle of identity of indiscernibles, haecceities,  or truthmakers) that presentism is compatible with some stories that  involve closed timelike curves, and that some of these stories can be
 viewed as time-travel stories.
 
 

Jamie Phillips (Clarion University)  "Why You Shouldn't Believe in Zombies (Or Their Friends!)"

There remains great debate in the philosophy of mind over whether zombies are logically
possible and, if they are, whether this entails that materialism is false.  In this paper, I employ a theoretically neutral and epistemically relevant conception of conceivability-developed by Stephen Yablo-to help the materialist win this debate.  That is, I argue that, though Yablo's conception of conceivability does entail that we are justified in believing that zombies are logically possible, this justification is only prima facie.  I argue, however, that this prima facie justification is clearly defeated by our available body of evidence.
 

Chad Ray (Central College), “Opportunity”

Today's dominant social contract theories unduly neglect the concept of opportunity, be their inspiration Kantian and "impartialist" or based on mutual advantage. Rawls and Nagel are examples of the first type; Gauthier and Nozick exemplify the second type. Impartialism sees unsatisfactory distributive outcomes only as vices of the basic structure; mutual advantage theory accepts any outcome from fair origins. Neither  theory asks what opportunities are available to those least well off. Both therefore have counterintuitive implications: Impartialists cannot address desert independent of the basic structure, nor ultimately avoid judging opportunities anyway; mutual advantageists recognize no duty of mutual respect apart from strategically negotiated contracts, and can fault a structure only for past unjust takings.  "Opportunity" is admittedly contestable, but appeal to it allows much: placing contestability about where it belongs; linking justice and desert; unlinking agreements from bargaining positions; and recognizing responsibilities of both individuals and society.
 

Phillip Robbins (Washington University), “Reverse Compositionality”

   It seems well-nigh impossible to know the meaning of a
   non-idiomatic phrase without knowing the meaning of its lexical parts.
   Neo-Russellian theorists like Fodor and Lepore contend that
   non-denotationalist accounts of meaning cannot explain why this is so,
   because they cannot provide for the 'reverse compositional' character
   of meaning.  First I argue that naive denotational semantics of the
   sort championed by Fodor and Lepore has the same problem.  Then I show
   how to revise denotationalism in order to solve this problem.
   Finally, I adapt this solution to the case of prototype semantics.
   The result is a version of prototype semantics which is no less
   compositional than its denotationalist counterpart.
 
 

Samuel Ruhmkorff (Simon’s Rock College of Bard), "Underdetermination and Antirealism"

 The problem of underdetermination starts with the observation that every scientific theory has at least one empirically equivalent rival.  Two theories are empirically equivalent if and only if they entail the same observational consequences.  Assuming that empirical evidence consists solely in the observation of a theory's consequences, and that all evidence is empirical, it follows that no evidence can favor a theory over its empirically equivalent rivals.  One well-known reaction to the problem of underdetermination, van Fraassen's constructive empiricism, holds that the practice of
science involves the acceptance of theories, where accepting a theory requires only the belief that the theory is empirically adequate.  Thus a committed constructive empiricist seeks to avoid the problem of underdetermination by refraining from the beliefs threatened by it. Larry Laudan and Jarrett Leplin have claimed that underdetermination is not a genuine problem.  In this paper, I respond to two of Laudan and Leplin's arguments.  I conclude that underdetermination is a genuine threat to scientific realism which deserves a non-trivializing response.  However, I also conclude that, insofar as underdetermination is a genuine threat to scientific realism, it is also a threat to constructive empiricism.
 

Sarah Sawyer (University of Kansas), “Externalism and Empty Terms”

The paper addresses the following question: What is the externalist to say about apparent natural kind terms that fail to refer, such as 'phlogiston' and 'ether'? The problem becomes apparent when we consider physical duplicates one of whom has a concept that refers to a natural kind, and the other of whom lives in a world where there is no plausible such natural kind to which any putative twin concept might refer. I address Segal's arguments from the existence of empty terms to the falsity of externalism and find them wanting. In addition, I suggest an externalist model for understanding such terms according to which syntax as well as semantics is externally individuated.
 
 

Charles Starkey (Washington University in St Louis), “Emotion and the Persistence of Character Traits”

 It is widely accepted that emotions have an influence on a person’s various traits of character.  In this essay I make the stronger argument that emotions are essential to the persistence of character traits.  This is the case because emotions prevent “axiological entropy,” that is, the decay of the sense of importance of the various values upon which character traits are based.  The decay of the sense of importance of values, if unchecked, it will diminish both our ability to properly evaluate what we encounter, and the ability of our practical reason to function properly.  I will then defend this account against several objections which deny that emotions have such an essential role in the persistence of character traits.
 
 

Anita Superson (University of Kentucky), "The Deferential Wife Revisited: Agency and Moral Responsibility"

Thomas Hill describes the Deferential Wife as utterly devoted to her husband, believing that a woman’s proper role is to serve her family.  She fails to see herself as having moral worth, and so lacks self-respect due to patriarchal socialization.  I argue that she is not responsible for lacking self-respect, and that not holding her responsible does not compromise her agency.  I rule out her being indifferent, negligent, self-deceived, disingenuous, and irrational.  She is a moral agent, but lacks second-order desires she could get only from being visionary.  Given her socialization, she could not be visionary, and could not have had reason to respect herself, and thus is not responsible for failing to do so.
 

Valerie Tiberius (University of Minnesota), “Cynicism, Optimism, and the Endorsement of Ends”

 The aim of this paper is to argue that cynicism is a prudential vice and optimism a prudential virtue, given the widely shared assumption that the good for a person requires the endorsement and pursuit of reflective ends or values.   I define cynicism as a set of cognitive and conative attitudes toward human beings in general; cynical
 people believe that human nature is bad and are therefore contemptuous of human beings.  I then argue that cynicism, so defined, interferes with people’s capacity to endorse the ends and projects that are normally requisite to human flourishing.  The virtue of optimism occupies the mean between cynicism and foolish optimism.  I distinguish optimism from realism (another quality that might be thought to occupy the mean), and I argue that optimism is the best bet for people concerned about their own flourishing.
 
 

Kenneth Williford (The University of Iowa), “Moore, the Diaphanousness of Consciousness, and Physicalism”

Moore’s 1903 “The Refutation of Idealism” is justly famous, but his 1910 paper “The Subject-Matter of Psychology” has been sadly neglected.  I extract from both papers Moore’s central claims about consciousness.  Moore’s offers a version of content externalism according to which different acts of consciousness are distinguished by the differences in their objects.   Moore also insisted upon the phenomenological diaphanousness of consciousness: consciousness, apart from a revealing of its objects, does not seem to be anything in particular.  Moore argues that the subject of consciousness might be some part of one’s body and that the diaphanousness of consciousness implies that consciousness itself cannot be physical.  Moore draws this conclusion because he is committed to the dubious thesis of the strong transparency of consciousness.  Once this premise is rejected, one can argue that far from posing an obstacle to physicalism, Moore’s view opens a way to it.
 

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